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Recent overviews on European monetary unification can be found in Bean (1992) and Eichengreen
1
(1993).
For the interaction between monetary and fiscal policies in a closed economy, Tabellini (1986), Alesina
2
and Tabellini (1987), Levine and Pearlman (1992), Levine (1993), Debelle (1993), Debelle and Fischer
(1994), Levine and Brociner (1994) and Krichel, Levine and Pearlman (1994).
For more recent work on currency areas in this tradition, see, e.g., Mélitz (1993) and Bayoumi (1994).
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1. Introduction
The Maastricht Treaty, which is based on the Delors Report (1989), formulates the
institutional framework in which a common monetary policy and national fiscal policies are to be
conducted within a European Monetary Union (EMU). In particular, the European Central Bank
(ECB) is modelled after the Bundesbank: it should be independent from fiscal policymakers while
its primary objective should be to guarantee price stability. Furthermore, countries desiring to enter
the EMU should meet certain convergence criteria involving public debt levels and fiscal deficits.
After joining the union, member countries should subject their fiscal policies to surveillance by the
European Commission.
1
A number of academics have criticized the fiscal convergence criteria (e.g., Buiter and
Kletzer, 1990, and Bean, 1992). Others maintain that surveillance of national policies within the
EMU is not necessary because financial markets will discipline national fiscal policies. Moreover,
the crowding out effect of domestic public debt on private investment in other members of the
union appears to be of only minor importance (see, e.g., Levine and Brociner (1994)).
This paper explores the rationale for constraints on national policies from the point of view
of the strategic interaction between monetary and fiscal policymakers. Our analysis incorporates
several channels through which national fiscal policies interact with the common monetary policy
in an EMU. In particular, by generating seigniorage, monetary policy impacts the public finances
2
directly. Moreover, surprise inflation can help tax and structural policies in boosting employment
and output. We focus on a second-best world where fiscal authorities need to rely on distortionary
taxation and where monetary authorities lack commitment. Our analysis reveals that such an
imperfect world provides a case for both entrance criteria involving the convergence of fiscal
policies and surveillance of national policies once the union has been formed. In fact, for a
monetary union to be in the interests of all member countries, not only fiscal policies but also
structural policies and labor market institutions should converge.
In stressing the need for convergence in fiscal and structural policies, we extend the
literature on optimum currency areas. Whereas the traditional literature emphasizes barriers to
international factor mobility and international trade and lack of diversification in trade as obstacles
to a monetary union (see e.g., Mundell, 1961; McKinnon, 1963; Kenen, 1969), we focus on
3
international differences in monetary and labor-market institutions as well as public spending needs.
Our analysis reveals that the size of an optimum currency area depends on the initial position of
2the central bank vis-à-vis the government, the degree of conservatism of the European Central Bank
(ECB), the importance of seigniorage and differences in structural policies (public indebtedness,
labor market flexibility and the efficiency of the tax system) as reflected in the so-called
government financing requirement. In particular, if national monetary arrangements are optimal, an
EMU is feasible only if the government financing requirements are identical in all participating
countries. The scope for an EMU becomes larger if money holdings are small and, in contrast to
the national central banks, the ECB can be made more conservative than society (in the sense that
it attaches a high priority to price stability). Intuitively, in this case, a conservative ECB can
substantially improve the price-stability performance of a national central bank. The associated
efficiency gains offset the costs associated with a union-wide monetary policy that can no longer be
attuned to country-specific circumstances. In this way, a more conservative central bank takes away
the need to impose severe restrictions on fiscal and structural policies. Indeed, there is a trade-off
between, on the one hand, designing the proper monetary institutions within the EMU, and, on the
other hand, requiring more convergence in other areas of economic policy.
Besides exploring entrance criteria into the EMU, the second main purpose of the paper is
to study the externalities associated with national policies once an EMU has been established and
individual participants can no longer be forced to comply with the entrance requirements. These
spillovers provide a case for surveillance of national policies. We find that the most disciplined
countries with relatively small financing requirements (i.e. countries with flexible labor markets and
efficient tax systems) suffer most from the lack of discipline in other countries. These countries,
therefore, are most interested in the European Commission conducting strict surveillance of national
policies in other countries. However, a conservative ECB may substitute for this surveillance; if the
ECB is sufficiently conservative, these countries do not suffer first order welfare losses from less
disciplined policies abroad. Indeed, adverse spillovers of fiscal and structural policies originate in
monetary distortions. Hence, surveillance of these policies acts as an indirect instrument to deal
with the imperfect conduct of monetary policy.
The remainder of this paper is as follows. Section 2 sets out the model while Section 3
presents the equilibrium policy outcomes. In analyzing the conditions under which an EMU is an
optimum currency areas, Section 4 deals with the entrance requirements for an EMU. The case for
surveillance is investigated in Section 5, which explores the externalities once an EMU has been
formed. Section 6 concludes the paper by summarizing the main policy conclusions.
2. The model
The EMU consists of n potentially participating countries. Commodities are tradable and
perfect substitutes, so that the inflation rate (determined by the ECB; see below) is the same across
the whole union. Moreover, capital is perfectly mobile between countries, while labor is immobile
3It is well known that labor is relatively immobile in Europe (for example due to linguistic, cultural,
4
social and institutional barriers).
Employment and output are directly related through the production function. Hence, instead of output,
5
employment could have been included in the objective functions, with the target employment level
corresponding to the employment level in absence of any distortions.
internationally.
4
Consider some country, say i (i=1,..,n). Following, among others, Alesina and Tabellini
(1987), Debelle (1993), Jensen (1994) and Beetsma and Bovenberg (1995), we assume that workers
are represented by trade unions whose sole objective is to achieve a target real wage rate, the
logarithm of which we normalize to zero. Therefore, the (log) of the nominal wage rate is set equal
to the (rationally) expected (log) price level, p . Nominal wage contracts are signed before policy is
e
selected. Accordingly, unions act as Stackelberg leaders vis-à-vis the authorities.
Output of a representative firm is Y = L , where L is labor, and is taxed at a rate J . The
i i i i
0
firm maximizes profits PL (1-J )-WL , where P and W represent the price level and the wage rate
i i i
0
(which is uniform across the entire union, because the expected price level inflation is uniform
across the union). Hence, (log) output is given by y = (0/(1-0))(B-B -J +log0), where B denotes the
i i
e
inflation rate and B the expected inflation rate. For convenience, we normalize output bye
subtracting the constant (0/(1-0))log0 from y . Without any consequences for our main results, we
i
set 0=½, so that normalized output, x , amounts to
i
x = B-B -J (2.1)
i i
e
Without tax distortions, x =0 in a rational expectations equilibrium (where B=B , see (2.1)).
i
e
In addition to distortionary output taxes, we allow for other, non-tax, distortions due to, for
example, union power in the labor market or monopoly power in commodity markets. The first-best
output level, i.e. output with neither tax nor non-tax distortions, is denoted by x . Thus, x >0
i i
measures the non-tax distortions and can be interpreted as an implicit tax on output. In fact, an
output subsidy can offset the implicit output tax (J =-x ), thereby raising output to its non-
i i
distortionary level x .
i
Society i's welfare function differs from that of the unions, because it accounts for the
preferences of not only workers but also non-workers. Society i's preferences, which are defined
over consumer price inflation, output and public spending, are represented by the following loss
function:
V = ½ [" B + (x -x ) + " (g -g ) ], " ," >0. (2.2)
S,i BS i i gS i i BS gS
2 2 2
Welfare losses increase in the deviations of inflation, (log) output and government spending (g is
i
government spending as a share of non-distortionary output) from their targets. The target level of
5
4Alesina and Grilli (1992, 1993) analyze the design of an ECB and the feasibility of an EMU while
6
allowing for different degrees of inflation aversion across countries.
As first pointed out by Rogoff (1985), society may want to appoint a central banker with preferences
7
that differ from society's preferences. See also below.
inflation corresponds to price stability while the target for output is given by its non-distortionary
level, x . The target for government spending, g , can be interpreted as the optimal share of non-
i i
distortionary output to be spent on public goods if (non-distortionary) lump-sum taxes would be
available (Debelle and Fischer, 1994; Beetsma and Bovenberg, 1995). Parameters " and " stand
BS gS
for the weights of the inflation and government spending objectives, respectively, relative to the
weight of the output objective, which we have normalized to unity. Only relative preference
weights matter for the outcomes. In the limiting case of " 64, the government spending share is
gS
set exogenously at g .
i
All countries attach the same relative preference weights to inflation and public spending.
6
Targets for employment and public spending, in contrast, are allowed to vary across countries.
Differences in target levels for output and employment may reflect international diversity in labor
market institutions. Differences in the targets for public spending indicate diverging preferences for
public goods.
3. Equilibrium policies and welfare under an EMU
Beetsma and Bovenberg (1995) study the case where monetary policy is decided at the
national level. The first-best equilibrium is reached if a single benevolent policymaker, who
controls both fiscal and monetary policy, can freely use lump-sum taxation. If this policymaker has
to resort to distortionary taxation because of limited access to lump-sum taxes, the resulting
equilibrium is second best. The absence of commitment results in additional welfare losses as the
policymaker is tempted to use unanticipated inflation as an indirect instrument to alleviate tax
distortions by raising employment. In this case, decentralizing monetary policy to an independent
central bank, which does not take into account the government budget constraint, can be welfare
improving. Intuitively, the failure to internalize the government budget constraint offsets the self-
defeating incentive to use unanticipated inflation to boost employment.
In an EMU, the ECB selects the common inflation rate for the entire region. The
preferences of the ECB are given by
V = ½ {" B + 3 [(x -x ) +" (g -g ) ]/n}, " >0, (3.1)
ECB BM i=1 i i gS i i BM
2 n 2 2
where the inflation weight, " , is allowed to differ from societies' inflation weight, " . The ECB
BM BS
7
equally weights the interests of all countries. In fact, if " =" , the objective function of the ECB
BM BS
is an equally weighted average of the individual societies' objective functions. We assume that the
B '
1
"
BM%1
B
e
%
1
n
j
n
i'1 Ji%x˜i .
5
The government budget constraint is derived in Appendix A of Beetsma and Bovenberg (1995).
8
Alesina and Tabellini (1987), Debelle (1993), Debelle and Fischer (1994) and Jensen (1994), among
9
others, assume that 6=1. However, as will become clear below, the value of 6 plays an important role in our
analysis.
ECB is not able commit to its policy announcements. Hence, it minimizes (3.1) subject to (2.1),
i=1,..,n , taking as given tax rates, public spending ratios as well as the expected inflation rate, B .e
The resulting reaction function amounts to
(3.2)
Larger (tax and non-tax) distortions in output and labor markets in any of the participating
countries or higher expected inflation induce the monetary authority to raise inflation in order to
protect employment.
Fiscal policy continues to be conducted at the national level. Country i's government faces
the following budget constraint
8
g + (1+D) d = J + 6B + 2 , (3.3)
i i i i
where D denotes the constant real interest rate and d $0 represents the stock of single-period
i
indexed government debt (expressed as shares of non-distortionary output). The government can
employ only a limited, exogenous amount of lump-sum taxation, which as a share of non-
distortionary output equals 2 . 6$0 stands for the constant ratio of real money holdings and non-
i
distortionary output. Seigniorage revenues are represented by 6B as all countries receive an equal9
share of the seigniorage revenues acquired by the ECB.
We can write the government budget constraint (3.3) as follows:
K / g + (1+D)d + x - 2 = [J +x ] + 6B + [g -g ]. (3.4)
i i i i i i i i i
where K is the government financing requirement (see Beetsma and Bovenberg, 1995), which
i
amounts to the government spending target g , debt servicing costs, (1+D)d , and a labor subsidy
i i
aimed at offsetting the implicit tax on output, x , net of the maximum amount of lump-sum taxes,
i
2 <g +(1+D)d +x . The last right-hand side of (3.4) represents the sources of finance: explicit and
i i i i
implicit tax revenues, J +x , seigniorage revenues, 6B, and the shortfall of government spending
i i
from its target, g -g .
i i
The government of country i selects the distortionary tax rate, J , and the public spending
i
ratio, g , to minimize the social welfare loss (2.2) subject to (2.1) and (3.3). The associated
i
Lagrangian is
£ = ½{" B +(B-B -J -x ) +" (g -g ) } + 8[g +(1+D)d -J -6B-2 ], (3.5)
BS i i gS i i i i i i
2 e 2 2
Ji%x˜i%B
e
&B '
1
1%"&1gS
˜Ki&6B%(Be&B) , i'1,..,n,
g˜i&gi '
"
&1
gS
1%"&1gS
˜Ki&6B%(Be&B) , i'1,..,n.
6B '
6
"
BM
1% 6
"
BM
%"
&1
gS
˜Ki &
6
"
BM
1% 6
"
BM
%"
&1
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˜Ki& ˜KA '
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"
BM
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BM
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&1
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"
BM
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&1
gS
˜Ki %
1
1%"&1gS
6
"
BM
1% 6
"
BM
%"
&1
gS
˜Ki& ˜KA ,
g˜i&gi '
"
&1
gS
1% 6
"
BM
%"
&1
gS
˜Ki %
"
&1
gS
1%"&1gS
6
"
BM
1% 6
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&1
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˜Ki& ˜KA ,
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where (2.1) has been used to eliminate x and where 8 denotes the Lagrange multiplier of the
i
budget constraint of government i. Optimization yields the following reaction functions for J and
i
g :
i
(3.6)
(3.7)
To interpret the reaction functions, we rewrite the government budget constraint as [ K +(B -
i
e
B)-6B] = [J +x +B -B] + [g -g ]. The left hand side of the equation, which appears at the right-hand
i i i i
e
sides of both (3.6) and (3.7), represents the residual government financing requirement of the fiscal
authorities, i.e. the financing requirement left for the fiscal authorities after taking into account
seigniorage and the impact of inflation surprises (i.e. B -B) on output. If " 64, the entire burden ofe
gS
residual finance falls on taxes as government spending is fixed at g.
Inflation, taxes and public spending
Imposing rational expectations (i.e. B=B ) and solving (3.2), (3.6) and (3.7), we arrive at thee
equilibrium policy outcomes,
(3.8)
(3.9)
(3.10)
where K denotes the average government financing requirement. With uniform financing
A
requirements (i.e. K = K ), the outcomes are the same as in an economy where monetary policy is
A i
V Ei ' V
N
i %
6
"
BM
&
"
BS
"
2
BM
N 2D
˜Ki ˜Ki& ˜KA %
"
BS
"
2
BM
%
6
2
"
2
BM 1%"
&1
gS
2N 2D
˜Ki& ˜KA
2
,
where V Ni /
"
BS
"
2
BM
%1%"&1gS
2N 2D
˜K2i , ND / 1%
6
"
BM
%"
&1
gS .
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selected by a national, independent central bank with the inflation weight " and which is
BM
involved in a Nash game with the fiscal authority (see Beetsma and Bovenberg 1995). In a country
featuring a lower than average financing requirement (i.e. K < K ), inflation and public spending are
i A
higher while taxes are lower than under a national central bank. Intuitively, in a monetary union
with a relatively large average financing requirement, high output taxes and substantial labor-
market distortions reduce average employment and output. Accordingly, the common central bank
is tempted to set a high inflation rate to stimulate employment. The additional seigniorage revenues
associated with the higher inflation rate allow all member countries, including the ones with a
relatively low financing requirement, to cut output taxes and raise spending.
Welfare
Society i's welfare loss can be written as,
(3.11)
V stands for the welfare loss if monetary policy is conducted at the national level by an
i
N
independent central bank with inflation weight " and which is involved in a Nash game with the
BM
fiscal authority.
With national monetary policymaking, the optimal inflation weight of the national central
bank is given by " =" /6 (see Beetsma and Bovenberg 1995). At that inflation weight, the
BM BS
second term at the right-hand side of (3.11) is zero. Accordingly, losses in a monetary union exceed
those with national monetary policy unless the national financing requirement happens to coincide
with the average (i.e. 5 =5 ). Intuitively, from the perspective of an individual country, the
i A
common central bank sets a sub-optimal inflation rate because it looks at the average rather than
the country-specific financing requirement in deciding on the community-wide inflation rate.
If the national central bank is not conservative enough (i.e. " <" /6), however, a country
BM BS
with a larger than average financing requirement may gain from entering a monetary union with a
central bank featuring the same price-stability weight as the national central bank (for such a
country the second term at the right-hand side is negative). The reason is that national
policymaking produces an excessively high inflation rate. Entrance into a monetary union with a
relatively low average financing requirement reduces the inflation rate, thereby moving closer to the
8second-best optimum. Intuitively, the failure of the common central bank to attune its monetary
policy to the country-specific financing requirement offsets the distortion in monetary policy due to
the absence of commitment.
4. When is the EMU an optimum currency area?
This section explores conditions under which an EMU is an optimum currency area. The
traditional literature on optimum currency areas deals with international factor mobility, the
openness of economies to international trade and diversification in trade (see e.g. Mundell, 1961;
Mckinnon, 1963; Kenen, 1969). We, in contrast, emphasize convergence of fiscal and structural
policies related to international differences in labor-market institutions and public-spending
objectives. Indeed, monetary policy is related to fiscal and structural policies through various
channels. In particular, monetary policy impacts the public finances by generating seigniorage.
Moreover, in achieving employment objectives, unanticipated inflation can aid tax and structural
policies in boosting output.
In this section, we explore whether the EMU can be Pareto-welfare improving in the sense
that none of the n potential participants lose when compared to the national monetary
policymaking. This implies that the optimum currency area consists of those countries that benefit
from community-wide decisionmaking on monetary policy. Optimality is defined within the context
of the current model. In particular, to sharpen the focus on fiscal and structural policies, we ignore
possible other advantages of an EMU. We abstract also from transfer payments between countries.
We explore various ways to extend the union to more countries, including entrance
requirements involving the convergence of fiscal and structural policies. Furthermore, we
investigate the role of monetary policy institutions and, in particular, the weight the ECB attaches
to price stability.
Monetary arrangements optimal outside the EMU
The trade-off of the fiscal authorities between taxes and public spending implied by (3.6)
and (3.7) is optimal from a social perspective. Hence, in order to assess whether a country profits
from entering EMU, we have to compare only deviations of the inflation rate from the second-best
inflation rate before and after entering the union (see also Appendix A). If the national central bank
(which is involved in a Nash game with the fiscal authority) attaches the optimal weight to price
stability (the optimal weight with national policymaking is " =" /6, see Beetsma and Bovenberg,
BM BS
1995), it sets the optimal inflation rate. Hence, country i enters the EMU only if the union delivers
the same inflation rate:
1
"
BM
1% 6
"
BM
%"
&1
gS
˜KA
˜Ki
'
6
"
BS
1% 6
2
"
BS
%"
&1
gS
,
"
opt
BM,i /
"
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1% 6
2
"
BS
%"
&1
gS
1%"&1gS
˜KA& ˜Ki
˜Ki
.
9
(4.1)
where the right-hand side is the optimal inflation rate (divided by K ) from society i's perspective
i
(see Beetsma and Bovenberg, 1995). Hence, for country i to be willing to participate, the price-
stability weight of the ECB should be (see Appendix B):
(4.2)
This price stability weight depends on the size of i's government financing requirement relative to
the average financing requirement. In particular, if country i is 'disciplined' in the sense that it
features a relatively low financing requirement, it prefers a rather 'conservative' ECB, which
attaches a relatively high priority to price stability (i.e. more priority than would be optimal outside
the union, " =" /6). The reason is that the ECB selects the inflation rate on the basis of the
BM BS
average rather than the country-specific financing requirements. Consequently, from the point of
view of countries with relatively low financing requirements, the ECB tends to set an inflation rate
that is too high. To offset this tendency, the ECB should be made more adverse against inflation.
Expression (4.2) indicates that countries disagree on the optimal price-stability weight if
financing requirements diverge. Hence, even if the price-stability weight of the ECB can be selected
freely, a monetary union is feasible only if financing requirements coincide. The formal entrance
requirements of the EMU emphasize convergence in public debt and fiscal deficits. Our analysis
indicates, however, that the EMU requires convergence not only in public debt but also in labor
market institutions and government spending.
Monetary arrangements suboptimal outside and inside the EMU
The scope for a monetary union may seem potentially greater if the inflation rate is sub-
optimal before a country enters the union. This is generally so if the national, independent Central
Bank features the same price-stability weight as society and is involved in a Nash game with the
government (see Beetsma and Bovenberg, 1995). In that case, country i enters the EMU if after
joining inflation would be at least as close to the optimal inflation rate as before joining the union:
1
"
BM
1% 6
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BM
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˜KA
˜Ki
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BS
1% 6
2
"
BS
%"
&1
gS
2
#
1
"
BS
1% 6
"
BS
%"
&1
gS
&
6
"
BS
1% 6
2
"
BS
%"
&1
gS
2
,
10
If 6=1, inflation would be optimal outside the union. Entrance to the union would make all countries
10
worse off unless their financing requirements would coincide with the average financing requirement.
(4.3)
where the first term on the right hand side is the inflation rate (divided by K ) resulting from the
i
Nash game between the government and a national central bank with price-stability weight " .
BS
Suppose first that " =" so that the ECB's inflation weight coincides with societies' and
BM BS
thus the pre-reform central banks' inflation weight. In that case, just as with optimal monetary
arrangements, an EMU is feasible only if financing requirements of all countries participating in the
union coincide. We can explain this by distinguishing two cases depending on real money holdings.
If 6<1, the countries with a lower than average financing requirement would be worse off inside a
union than outside it. The reason is that before entering the union inflation is already too high from
a social point of view. By joining countries with a higher financing requirement, the common
central bank is tempted to push inflation even higher, thereby diverging even further from the
optimum. If 6>1, in contrast, inflation is too low because the central bank does not take into
account the value of seigniorage to budget. In that case, countries featuring a financing
10
requirement above average suffer from entering the union; by merging with a group of countries
with lower financing requirements inflation falls further below the optimum.
Monetary arrangements suboptimal outside the EMU
The benefits of the union are potentially greater if, in contrast to the preferences of the
independent national central banks (involved in a Nash game with the fiscal authority), the
preferences of an international institution like the ECB, which is further removed from domestic
political pressures, can be made to differ from those of society. In that case, perfect convergence in
financing requirements is generally not required to make the EMU possible. Intuitively, the benefits
associated with moving towards better monetary arrangements under EMU offset the costs
associated with one union-wide inflation rate that is not attuned to the specific circumstances of
each country. To show this, we rank the government financing requirements in their order of
magnitude, so that K # K #..# K . For 6$1, the maximum ratio of the largest and the smallest
1 2 n
government financing requirement that is still compatible with the existence of a price-stability
weight of the ECB under which all countries benefit from entering the union is (see Appendix C):
˜K
n
˜K1
max
'
(26&1)(1%"&1gS)% 6
2
"
BS
1%"&1gS%
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2
"
BS
$ 1.
˜Kn
˜K1
max
'
1%"&1gS%
6
2
"
BS
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2
"
BS
>0,
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(4.4)
Complete convergence in financing requirements is required only if 6=1. In that case, a national
central bank delivers the optimal inflation rate as the failure to internalize the government budget
constraint exactly offsets the self-defeating incentive to boost employment through unanticipated
inflation. Hence, the potential benefits of different monetary arrangements in the union are zero
since monetary arrangements outside the union are already optimal. If 6>1, however, the inflation
rate is too low under a national central bank. By making the ECB less inflation adverse than
society, welfare gains can be reaped. These gains can offset the costs of imperfect convergence.
Indeed, the left-hand side of (4.4) exceeds unity so that perfect convergence is not required.
For 6<1, the maximum ratio of the financing requirements, for which an EMU is still
feasible, is (see Appendix C)
(4.5)
and ( K / K ) =4, otherwise. The allowed divergence of financing requirements increases if money
n 1
max
holdings fall. For 6 small enough (in particular, if 6=0), it is always possible to find a price-
stability weight of the ECB for which all countries benefit -- irrespective of international
differences in financing requirements. In that case, therefore, adjustments in monetary institutions
suffice to make the EMU feasible and no convergence in fiscal and structural policy is required.
Intuitively, if 6<1, the actual inflation rate under national policymaking exceeds the optimal
inflation rate. If money holdings become smaller, inflation yields less seigniorage. Accordingly, the
optimal inflation rate declines even further below the inflation rate under national policymaking.
This provides more scope for an ECB with properly adjusted preferences to improve on the price-
stability performance of a national central bank. Indeed, a more conservative ECB takes away the
need to impose restrictions on fiscal and structural policies. Hence, a more conservative ECB and
convergence requirements on fiscal and structural policies are substitutes.
Monetary union as a way towards independent monetary policy
The EMU might be a way not only to change the preferences of the monetary authorities,
but also to decentralize monetary policy. In particular, with national policymaking, central banks
may be under the control of the government. These dependent central banks thus internalize the
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government budget constraint. The ECB, in contrast, is likely to be independent and involved in a
Nash game with the fiscal authorities in the union, so that it does not take into account the
government budget constraints. Then, an EMU is feasible if inflation after joining the EMU with an
independent CB is at least as close to its social optimum as it is with national decisionmaking by a
dependent central bank:
(4.6)
where the first term on the right hand side is the inflation rate (divided by K ) effectively selected
i
by a fiscal authority who has control over domestic monetary policy (see Beetsma and Bovenberg,
1995).
First, we investigate convergence requirements if the inflation weight of the ECB can not
be adjusted (" =" ). In this case, countries must be sufficiently disciplined compared to the rest
BM BS
of the union to find it in their interests to join the union. In particular, the maximum relative
deviation of the individual financing requirement from the average that allows an undisciplined
country to benefit from the union is given by (see Appendix D):
(4.7)
Countries with a higher financing requirement than given by (4.7) stay out of the union because
they find the inflation rate in the union too low as the common central bank fails to internalize
their substantial seigniorage needs. Appendix E shows that there exists a unique value, say 6 , of*
6>1 for which ( K / K ) =1. For 6>6 , an EMU is not feasible, even if financing requirements
n A
max *
coincide. The reason is that with large money holdings an independent central bank produces
higher welfare losses than a dependent central bank even in a closed economy with national
decisionmaking (see also Beetsma and Bovenberg, 1995). Intuitively, with large money holdings,
seigniorage revenues are relatively important so that the optimal inflation rate is relatively high.
The independent central bank, however, fails to internalize the social value of seigniorage in
providing public revenues and thus sets the inflation rate at a level that is much too low. This
distortion, which produces too low an inflation rate, dominates the distortion due to the inflation
bias under a dependent central bank associated with self-defeating incentives to use unanticipated
inflation to boost employment.
Just as undisciplined countries, the more disciplined countries may not want to enter the
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union. Their fear, however, is that inflation is too high in the union. In particular, the most
disciplined country enters only if the average financing requirement, K , does not exceed the
A
following upper bound (see Appendix D):
(4.8)
If 6 approaches zero, financing requirements must converge completely from the perspective of the
most disciplined country. The reason is that the seigniorage motive for inflation, which a dependent
central bank internalizes, vanishes. Hence, making a central bank independent does not help in
reducing the inflation bias of monetary policy. Consequently, no country with a lower than average
financing requirement wants to enter the union: the higher financing requirement in the rest of the
union raises inflation while decentralizing monetary policy does not produce lower inflation.
Overall, inflation rises, thereby diverging further from its optimum.
To summarize, an EMU requires sufficient convergence of financing requirements in order
to induce both the most and the least disciplined countries to join the union. How much financing
requirements can diverge from the average depends on money holdings. For small money holdings,
the more disciplined countries are unlikely to join because a monetary union is likely to increase
the inflation bias of monetary policy. For large money holdings, in contrast, the least disciplined
countries decline to enter as an independent ECB ignores their seigniorage needs.
The feasibility of an EMU is enhanced if the price stability weight of the ECB can diverge
from that of society. The maximum ratio of the largest and the smallest financing requirement for
which one can find a price stability weight for the ECB so that all countries benefit from joining
the union is (see Appendix F),
(4.9)
and ( K / K ) =4, otherwise. Provided financing requirements are sufficiently close, one can find a
n 1
max
price stability weight of the central bank on which all participants agree. The convergence
requirements become less severe if money holdings, 6, decline. Intuitively, with small money
holdings, the social value of inflation in providing seigniorage is only small. Hence, the inflation
rate with national decisionmaking by a dependent central bank is much too high as the self-
defeating incentive to stimulate employment dominates the seigniorage motive. With sub-optimal
monetary institutions outside the EMU, a conservative ECB can provide a much better performance
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in guaranteeing price stability.
With small money holdings, there is a trade-off between, on the one hand, making the ECB
more conservative, and, on the other hand, requiring more convergence. In particular, if the ECB
cannot be made more conservative than society, financing requirements need to converge in order
to convince the more disciplined countries to join the union (see expression (4.8)). However, if the
ECB can be made sufficiently conservative, convergence requirements are not needed (see (4.9)
with a small value for 6).
Asymmetric initial monetary arrangements
In the previous subsection, we assumed that all national central banks are dependent. In
practice, however, some potential participants are likely to feature more independent and
conservative central banks than others. The Bundesbank, for example, is known to be more
independent and conservative than the Italian central bank. Therefore, we consider the case in
which one country, say Germany, has an independent central bank with the optimal degree of
inflation aversion before it joins the EMU. Hence, for Germany to be willing to participate, the
ECB's price-stability weight should be given by (4.2) so that the ECB delivers the optimal inflation
rate from the point of view of Germany.
In contrast to Germany, all other potential participants feature a dependent central bank
with price stability weight " . Moreover, their financing requirements exceed that of Germany
BS
( K # K #..# K , so that Germany is country 1). In that case, some country i, say Italy, is only willing
1 2 n
to enter a "Germany-dominated" EMU if
(4.10)
Italy is more willing to participate the smaller is the relative difference between K and K .
1 i
Intuitively, the closer the financing requirements of Italy and Germany are, the closer the optimal
inflation weight of Italy is to that of Germany (and thus of the ECB). This again emphasizes the
importance of convergence in financing requirements for an EMU to be feasible. Italy's willingness
to participate increases if seigniorage revenues become less important as indicated by a small value
for 6. For 6 close enough to zero, an EMU is always preferable for Italy, no matter how large its
financing requirement is. Intuitively, the benefits of joining the EMU, namely reducing the self-
defeating incentive to boost employment under discretion, dominate the costs, namely the failure of
the ECB to meet the specific seigniorage needs of Italy.
5. Externalities in an EMU
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This section studies the situation after the EMU has been formed. In particular, it analyses
how a larger financing requirement in a particular country affects the other member countries of the
union. These spillovers, which originate in the common inflation rate set by the ECB, in principle
provide a case for some kind of coordination or surveillance of national fiscal and structural
policies within a monetary union.
The externalities are found by differentiating V with respect to K :
i j
E
(5.1)
If initial financing requirements coincide, the sign of the spillover depends only on whether
the ECB is sufficiently conservative from a social point of view. In particular, if the ECB is not
conservative enough (i.e. " <" /6), a marginal increase in the financing requirement imposes an
BM BS
adverse spillover on other countries. The reason is that initial inflation is too high because the ECB
does not attach sufficient weight to price stability. A larger financing requirement in one of the
member countries induces the ECB to raise inflation even further, thereby imposing a first-order
loss on the other members of the union. The spillover effects vanish if monetary arrangements are
optimal (i.e. " =" /6). Thus, the case for surveillance of fiscal and structural policies rests on
BM BS
suboptimal monetary arrangements. Indeed, restrictions on national fiscal and structural policies act
as indirect instruments to deal with imperfections in the conduct of monetary policy.
The case of a disciplined member country, which features a low financing requirement,
illustrates how surveillance of fiscal and structural policies can substitute for a properly designed
central monetary institution. Such a disciplined country can protect itself against undisciplined
policies in the rest of the union in two ways. One way is to set the price stability weight of the
ECB according to (4.2) so that the ECB is sufficiently conservative. In that case, the inflation rate
in the EMU is optimal from the point of view of the disciplined country. Hence, a marginal
increase in inflation due to a larger foreign financing requirement does not generate any first-order
effect on domestic welfare.
An alternative way for the disciplined country to deal with adverse spillovers is to increase
fiscal discipline and reduce labor market distortions in the rest of the union. This can be illustrated
with the case in which the price stability weight of the ECB coincides with the optimal weight
under national policy making, i.e. " =" /6. If monetary policy is thus optimal 'on average', the
BM BS
spillover is determined by the second term at the right-hand side of (5.1). Thus, whereas disciplined
countries featuring a less than average financing requirement suffer a negative externality from a
higher financing requirement abroad, undisciplined countries with a relatively high financing
requirement profit if the other countries raise their financing requirement. Intuitively, since the
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If moneyholdings are large enough (in particular, if 6>1), countries with a financing requirement above
11
average (i.e. K > K ) benefit from an increase in foreign financing requirements. From the perspective of these
i A
countries, inflation is not high enough to meet their seigniorage needs. Hence, a higher inflation rate boosting
seigniorage is in the interests of these countries.
monetary arrangements are attuned to domestic circumstances, each country wants other countries
to become more like itself. From the perspective of a disciplined country, for example, inflation is
too high in union. Therefore, it dislikes everything that raises inflation further, including an
increase in the financing requirement in the rest of the union.
The disciplined country becomes more interested in surveillance of foreign policies, the
more monetary arrangements diverge from what it would consider optimal. The case in which the
price stability weight of the ECB coincides with that of society illustrates this. The spillover can
then be written as follows:
(5.2)
The externality depends on the relative financing requirement but also on real money holdings. If
money holdings are relatively small (i.e. 6<1), disciplined countries with a lower than average
financing requirement ( K < K ) unambiguously suffer from a higher financing requirement abroad.
i A
11
The lower real money holdings are, the less efficient monetary arrangements become from the point
of view of these countries. These monetary imperfections produce larger adverse spillovers
associated with less disciplined policies abroad.
Expression (5.2) indicates also that externalities are worse for the most disciplined
countries. The reason is that these countries prefer a rather low community-wide inflation rate as
their financing needs are relatively low. Hence, they suffer most from the boost to inflation
associated with larger financing requirements abroad. These results suggest that countries with the
most efficient tax systems, the lowest public debt and the most flexible labor markets (i.e.,
countries with the lowest financing requirements) are most interested in strict surveillance by the
European Commission of fiscal and structural policies in other countries.
6. Conclusions
This paper has explored the interaction between monetary policy and other macroeconomic
policies in the EMU. Modelling an imperfect world with distortionary taxes, labor-market
imperfections, and imperfect commitment, we established a case for entrance requirements into the
EMU involving convergence of not only public debt but also labor market institutions and public
17
spending. The case for convergence criteria originates in the interaction between an ECB lacking
commitment and fiscal and structural policies lacking instruments to eliminate all market
imperfections. Within this framework, we showed how national policies can exert spillover effects
on other member states by affecting the inflation rate in the EMU. These externalities provide
arguments in favor of surveillance of national policies once an EMU has been established.
An important theme of the paper is that properly designing monetary institutions by
adjusting the preferences of the ECB may substitute for entrance requirements and surveillance
involving other policies and institutions. In this respect, an important area for future research is to
incorporate stochastic shocks, which give rise to a trade-off between flexibility and credibility
(Laskar, 1989; Lohmann, 1992). In particular, distorting policy preferences, while yielding benefits
in terms of enhanced credibility of low-inflation policies, would become costly in terms of
stabilizing shocks. A similar trade-off would apply to constraints on fiscal policy: convergence and
surveillance of fiscal policy may harm stabilization policy. Hence, it would be interesting to
explore in more depth what determines the optimal combination of, on the one hand, adjusting
policy preferences of the ECB, and, on the other hand, constraining national fiscal policies.
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Technical appendices
A: Welfare loss is one-one related to deviation of inflation from the socially optimal rate.
We show that in making welfare comparisons, it suffices to compare deviations of inflation from the
socially optimal inflation rate.
In all equilibria the relationship between total taxation (the sum of explicit and implicit taxes) and the
government spending gap is g-g=" (J+x). Using this relationship, we have that,
gS
-1
(A.1)
(A.2)
Substitution of (A.1) and (A.2) into society's welfare loss function yields,
(A.3)
This expression is mimimised when the inflation rate is at its social optimum,
(A.4)
Using the definition of B it is easy to see that V (B -,)=V (B +,) for all ,. This completes the proof.* * *
S S
B: Proof of (4.2).
Because the trade-off between taxes and the government spending gap is always optimal, society i's
optimal ECB inflation weight follows upon equating inflation under an EMU with the socially optimal
inflation rate,
(B.1)
and solving for " .
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C: Proofs of (4.4) and (4.5).
An EMU is feasible (eq.(4.3)) if and only if, for i=1,..,n,
(C.1)
where . Let K #..# K , as in the main
1 n
text.
C.1: Proof of (4.4).
This is the case of 6>1. From (C.1) we have that country i is prepared to participate in an EMU if
and only if (note that (>* if 6>1),
(C.2)
The conditions for an EMU to be feasible ((C.2), i=1,..,n) can be combined to the following two:
$( K / K )$* and $( K / K )#2(-*. (C.3)
A n A 1
Define " and " as the values of " for which the first and second expression in (C.3) are met with
BM BM BM
U L
equality, respectively. Hence,
(C.4)
(C.5)
Then, " is the upperbound on " above which an EMU is not feasible, while " is the lowerbound on
BM BM BM
U L
" below which an EMU is not feasible. An EMU is feasible if and only if " $" and the set of ECB
BM BM BM
U L
weights which leaves each country at least as well off as staying out of the EMU is [" ," ]. Note that
BM BM
L U
" is decreasing in K and that " is decreasing in K . The maximum ratio ( K / K ) then follows upon
BM n BM 1 n 1
U L max
equating the expressions (C.4) and (C.5) for " and " , respectively.
BM BM
U L
C.2: Proof of (4.5).
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This is the case of 6<1. We follow the same line of reasoning as in the proof of (4.4). The
conditions for an EMU to be feasible can be combined to the following two (note that now (<*):
2(-*#$( K / K ) and $( K / K )#*. (C.6)
A n A 1
The first expression gives the upperbound " and the second expression gives the lowerbound " :
BM BM
U L
(C.7)
(C.8)
Equating the right hand sides of (C.7) and (C.8) yields the maximum ratio (4.5).
D: Proofs of (4.7) and (4.8).
An EMU is feasible (eq.(4.6)) if and only if, for i=1,..,n,
(D.1)
where
Note that *>(. Let K #..# K , as in the main text. From (D.1) we have that country i is prepared to participate
1 n
in an EMU if and only if,
(D.2)
These conditions for an EMU to be feasible ((D.2), i=1,..,n) can be combined to the following two:
2(-*#$( K / K ) and $( K / K )#*. (D.3)
A n A 1
Equation (4.7), the upperbound on K / K follows by setting the first expression in (D.3) to equality. Similarly,
n A
the upperbound on K from country 1's perspective follows by setting the second expression in (D.3) to
A
equality.
E: Proof that there is a unique 6(>1) such that ( K / K ) =1.
n a
max
f(6) / (6&2)(1%"&1gS)%(63&26)/"BS ' 0.
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Set the right hand side of (4.7) equal to one. This equation can be reduced to
(E.1)
If 6#1, the left hand side of (E.1) is negative, while if 6 is large enough, the left hand side of (E.1) is
positive. Finally, upon differentiating we see that fN(6)>0, if 6$1, which completes the proof.
F: Proof of (4.9).
We follow the same reasoning as in appendix C. Let K #..# K , as in the main text. The conditions
1 n
for feasibility of an EMU can be combined to the following two:
2(-*#$( K / K ) and $( K / K )#*, (F.1)
A n A 1
where $, ( and * are defined as in appendix D. Setting the first expression in (F.1) to equality gives the
upperbound " on " , while setting the second expression in (F.1) to equality gives the lowerbound " .
BM BM BM
U L
Upon equating " and " we derive (4.9).
BM BM
U L
